{"189931":{"#nid":"189931","#data":{"type":"news","title":"POSSE Core Contributors Fuhrmann and Sechser Publish POSSE Paper","body":[{"value":"\u003Cp\u003EThe Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE) core members\u0026nbsp;\u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/posse.gatech.edu\/participants\/matthew-fuhrmann\u0022\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003EMatthew Fuhrmann\u003C\/strong\u003E\u003C\/a\u003E\u0026nbsp;and\u0026nbsp;\u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/posse.gatech.edu\/participants\/todd-sechser-usa\u0022\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003ETodd Sechser\u003C\/strong\u003E\u003C\/a\u003E\u0026nbsp;recently published their article \u0022Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail\u0022 in International Organization, which was their first POSSE paper.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003EAbstract: \u0026nbsp;\u003C\/strong\u003EDo nuclear weapons offer coercive advantages in international crisis bargaining? Almost seventy years into the nuclear age, we still lack a complete answer to this question. While scholars have devoted significant attention to questions about nuclear deterrence, we know comparatively little about whether nuclear weapons can help compel states to change their behavior. This study argues that, despite their extraordinary power, nuclear weapons are uniquely poor instruments of compellence. Compellent threats are more likely to be effective under two conditions: first, if a challenger can credibly threaten to seize the item in dispute; and second, if enacting the threat would entail few costs to the challenger. Nuclear weapons, however, meet neither of these conditions. \u0026nbsp;They are neither useful tools of conquest nor low- cost tools of punishment+ Using a new dataset of more than 200 militarized compellent threats from 1918 to 2001, we find strong support for our theory: compellent threats from nuclear states are no more likely to succeed, even after accounting for possible selection effects in the data. While nuclear weapons may carry coercive weight as instruments of deterrence, it appears that these effects do not extend to compellence.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/posse.gatech.edu\/sites\/posse.gatech.edu\/files\/Sechser%20and%20Fuhrmann%20IO%202013.pdf\u0022\u003EFull Article \u0026gt;\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETodd\u0026nbsp;S.\u0026nbsp;Sechser\u0026nbsp;and\u0026nbsp;Matthew\u0026nbsp;Fuhrmann\u0026nbsp;(2013).\u0026nbsp;Crisis\u0026nbsp;Bargaining\u0026nbsp;and\u0026nbsp;Nuclear\u0026nbsp;Blackmail.\u0026nbsp;\u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/journals.cambridge.org\/action\/displayJournal?jid=INO\u0022\u003EInternational\u0026nbsp;Organization\u003C\/a\u003E,\u0026nbsp;67,\u0026nbsp;pp\u0026nbsp;173\u0026shy;195\u0026nbsp;doi:10.1017\/S0020818312000392\u003C\/p\u003E","summary":null,"format":"limited_html"}],"field_subtitle":"","field_summary":[{"value":"\u003Cp\u003EThe Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE) core members \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/posse.gatech.edu\/participants\/matthew-fuhrmann\u0022\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003EMatthew Fuhrmann\u003C\/strong\u003E\u003C\/a\u003E and \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/posse.gatech.edu\/participants\/todd-sechser-usa\u0022\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003ETodd Sechser\u003C\/strong\u003E\u003C\/a\u003E recently published their article \u0022Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail\u0022 in International Organization, which was their first POSSE paper.\u003C\/p\u003E","format":"limited_html"}],"field_summary_sentence":"","uid":"27694","created_gmt":"2013-02-05 15:15:49","changed_gmt":"2016-10-08 03:13:37","author":"Debbie Mobley","boilerplate_text":"","field_publication":"","field_article_url":"","dateline":{"date":"2013-02-05T00:00:00-05:00","iso_date":"2013-02-05T00:00:00-05:00","tz":"America\/New_York"},"extras":[],"hg_media":{"191491":{"id":"191491","type":"image","title":"International Organization","body":null,"created":"1449179858","gmt_created":"2015-12-03 21:57:38","changed":"1475894841","gmt_changed":"2016-10-08 02:47:21","alt":"International Organization","file":{"fid":"196283","name":"international_organization.jpg","image_path":"\/sites\/default\/files\/images\/international_organization_0.jpg","image_full_path":"http:\/\/www.tlwarc.hg.gatech.edu\/\/sites\/default\/files\/images\/international_organization_0.jpg","mime":"image\/jpeg","size":12349,"path_740":"http:\/\/www.tlwarc.hg.gatech.edu\/sites\/default\/files\/styles\/740xx_scale\/public\/images\/international_organization_0.jpg?itok=lw79YfmW"}}},"media_ids":["191491"],"groups":[{"id":"1286","name":"Center for International Strategy, Technology, and Policy (CISTP)"}],"categories":[],"keywords":[],"core_research_areas":[],"news_room_topics":[],"event_categories":[],"invited_audience":[],"affiliations":[],"classification":[],"areas_of_expertise":[],"news_and_recent_appearances":[],"phone":[],"contact":[{"value":"\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022mailto:wfoster8@mail.gatech.edu\u0022\u003EWill Foster\u003C\/a\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003ESenior Research Associate\u003Cbr \/\u003ECenter for International Strategy, Technology, and Policy (CISTP)\u003Cbr \/\u003ESam Nunn School of International Affairs\u003Cbr \/\u003EGeorgia Institute of Technology\u003Cbr \/\u003Ecell 520-440-0807\u003C\/p\u003E","format":"limited_html"}],"email":["wfoster8@mail.gatech.edu"],"slides":[],"orientation":[],"userdata":""}}}