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  <title><![CDATA[Dissertation Defense: Adam O'Neill]]></title>
  <body><![CDATA[<p>Adam O'Neill</p>

<p>School of Computer Science</p>

<p>College of Computing</p><p>Georgia Institute of Technology</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>



<p>Date: Monday, August 9, 2010</p>

<p>Time: 1:00 pm - 3:00 pm EDT</p><p>Location: TBD</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>



<h4>Committee</h4><ul><li>Dr. Alexandra Boldyreva (Advisor, School of 
Computer
Science)</li><li>Dr. Mihir Bellare (Computer Science and Engineering, 
University of
California at San Diego)</li><li>Dr. Richard Lipton (School of Computer 
Science)</li><li>Dr.
Chris Peikert (School of Computer Science)</li><li>Dr. Dana Randall 
(School of Computer
Science)</li><li>Dr. Patrick Traynor (School of Computer Science)</li></ul>

<p>&nbsp;</p>





<h4>Abstract</h4>



<p>Trapdoor functions, introduced in the seminal paper of
Diffie and Hellman (IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 1976), are a fundamental 
notion in
modern cryptography. &nbsp;Informally,
trapdoor functions are easy to evaluate but hard to invert unless given 
an
additional input called the trapdoor.&nbsp;
Specifically, the classical security notion considered for trapdoor
functions is {\em one-wayness}, which asks that it be hard to invert a
uniformly random point in the range without the trapdoor.</p>

<p>Motivated by the demands of emerging applications of
cryptography as well as stronger security properties desired from 
higher-level
cryptographic primitives constructed out of trapdoor functions, this 
thesis
studies new strengthenings to the notion of one-way trapdoor functions 
and
their applications.&nbsp; Our results are
organized along two separate threads, wherein we introduce two new
cryptographic primitives that strengthen the notion of one-wayness for 
trapdoor
functions in different ways:</p><p>*** Deterministic Encryption:&nbsp; Our 
notion of deterministic public-key
encryption addresses the weaknesses of using trapdoor functions directly
 for
encryption articulated by Goldwasser and Micali (J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 
1984)
to the extent possible {\em without} randomizing the encryption function
(whereas Goldwasser and Micali address them using randomized 
encryption).&nbsp; Specifically, deterministic encryption ensures
no partial information is leaked about a high-entropy plaintext or even
multiple correlated such plaintexts.&nbsp;
Deterministic encryption has applications to fast search on encrypted
data, securing legacy protocols, and ``hedging'' randomized encryption 
against
bad randomness.&nbsp; We show a secure construction
of deterministic encryption in the random oracle model of Bellare and 
Rogaway
(CCS 1993) meeting our security notion for an unbounded number of 
arbitrarily
correlated plaintexts based on any randomized encryption scheme, as well
 as a
more efficient such construction based on RSA.&nbsp;
We also show a secure construction of deterministic encryption without
random oracles meeting our security notion for a {\em bounded} number of
arbitrarily correlated plaintexts based on the notion of lossy trapdoor 
functions
introduced by Peikert and Waters (STOC 2008).</p><p>*** Adaptive 
Trapdoor Functions: Our notion of adaptive
trapdoor functions asks that one-wayness be preserved in the presence of
 an
inversion oracle that can be queried on some range points.&nbsp; The main 
application we give is the
construction of black-box chosen-ciphertext secure public-key encryption
(meaning the code of the underlying primitive is not used in the 
construction
besides running it) from weaker general assumptions.&nbsp; Namely, we show 
such a construction of
chosen-ciphertext secure public-key encryption from adaptive trapdoor
functions.&nbsp; We then show that adaptive
trapdoor functions can be realized from lossy trapdoor functions 
introduced by
Peikert and Waters (STOC 2008) and from correlated-product secure 
trapdoor
functions introduced by Rosen and Segev (TCC 2009); in fact, we show 
adaptivity
is strictly {\em weaker} than the latter notions (in a black-box 
sense).&nbsp; Notably, by slightly extending our framework
and considering ``tag-based'' adaptive trapdoor functions we obtain 
exactly the
chosen-ciphertext secure encryption schemes proposed in the these works,
thereby unifying them, although the schemes we obtain via adaptive 
trapdoor
functions are actually more efficient.</p>]]></body>
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      <value><![CDATA[Stronger Security Notions for Trapdoor Functions and Applications]]></value>
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      <value><![CDATA[<p>For more information, contact <a href="mailto:denton@cc.gatech.edu">Dani Denton</a>.</p>]]></value>
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