{"653431":{"#nid":"653431","#data":{"type":"event","title":"CANCELLED: ARC Colloquium: Divyarthi Mohan (Tel Aviv University)","body":[{"value":"\u003Cp align = \u0022center\u0022\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003EAlgorithms \u0026amp; Randomness Center (ARC)\u003C\/strong\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp  align = \u0022center\u0022\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003EDivyarthi Mohan (Tel Aviv University)\u003C\/strong\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp  align = \u0022center\u0022\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003EMonday, January 10, 2022\u003C\/strong\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp  align = \u0022center\u0022\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003EKlaus 1116 - 11:00 am\u003C\/strong\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp\u003E\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003ETitle:\u0026nbsp; \u003C\/strong\u003ESimplicity and Optimality in Multi-Item Auctions\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003EAbstract:\u0026nbsp; \u003C\/strong\u003EDesigning mechanisms to maximize revenue is a fundamental problem in mathematical economics and has various applications like online ad auctions and spectrum auctions. Unfortunately, optimal auctions for selling multiple items can be unreasonably complex and computationally intractable. In this talk, we consider a revenue-maximizing seller with n items facing a single unit-demand buyer. Our work shows that simple mechanisms can achieve almost optimal revenue. We approached the tradeoffs of simplicity formally through the lens of computation and menu size. Our main result provides a mechanism that gets a (1 \u0026minus; \u0026epsilon;)-approximation to the optimal revenue in time quasi-polynomial in n and has quasi polynomial (symmetric) menu complexity.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\n\u0026nbsp;\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nJoint work with Pravesh Kothari, Ariel Schvartzman, Sahil Singla, and Matt Weinberg.\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp\u003E----------------------------------\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/divyarthi.github.io\/\u0022\u003ESpeaker\u0026#39;s Webpage\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp\u003E\u003Cem\u003EVideos of recent talks are available at: \u003C\/em\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/smartech.gatech.edu\/handle\/1853\/46836\u0022\u003E\u003Cem\u003Ehttps:\/\/smartech.gatech.edu\/handle\/1853\/46836\u003C\/em\u003E\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/mailman.cc.gatech.edu\/mailman\/listinfo\/arc-colloq\u0022\u003E\u003Cem\u003EClick here to subscribe to the seminar email list: arc-colloq@Klauscc.gatech.edu \u003C\/em\u003E\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n","summary":null,"format":"limited_html"}],"field_subtitle":"","field_summary":"","field_summary_sentence":[{"value":"Simplicity and Optimality in Multi-Item Auctions - Klaus 1116 at 11am"}],"uid":"27544","created_gmt":"2021-12-06 18:31:54","changed_gmt":"2022-01-10 14:13:52","author":"Francella Tonge","boilerplate_text":"","field_publication":"","field_article_url":"","field_event_time":{"event_time_start":"2022-01-10T11:00:00-05:00","event_time_end":"2022-01-10T12:00:00-05:00","event_time_end_last":"2022-01-10T12:00:00-05:00","gmt_time_start":"2022-01-10 16:00:00","gmt_time_end":"2022-01-10 17:00:00","gmt_time_end_last":"2022-01-10 17:00:00","rrule":null,"timezone":"America\/New_York"},"extras":[],"groups":[{"id":"70263","name":"ARC"}],"categories":[],"keywords":[],"core_research_areas":[],"news_room_topics":[],"event_categories":[{"id":"1795","name":"Seminar\/Lecture\/Colloquium"}],"invited_audience":[{"id":"78761","name":"Faculty\/Staff"},{"id":"177814","name":"Postdoc"},{"id":"174045","name":"Graduate students"},{"id":"78751","name":"Undergraduate students"}],"affiliations":[],"classification":[],"areas_of_expertise":[],"news_and_recent_appearances":[],"phone":[],"contact":[],"email":[],"slides":[],"orientation":[],"userdata":""}}}